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From: | "G Stolwyk" <stolwyk@wave.co.nz> |
Date: | Sun, 4 Mar 2001 12:46:20 +1300 |
Hugh,
Let us discuss
valuations.
It so happens, I am looking at some option
certificates of SMART, a property company. It went belly-up in the 1987
crash.
I received a 1986 Annual report with a photo
of a brick warehouse located close to the SMART H.Q. on the Karangahape
road. It mentioned that the valuation was about $1 mill.
H: I suppose, you were excited when you
saw that valuation?
G: I decided to have a look at the
property. The land value could not have been
that high on the perimeter? And the
warehouse was not that large either!
I had an uneasy feeling that something was amiss, I
sold most of the options!
In those days of higher inflation and
high building contract rates, government valuations were ignored.The
BNZ had plenty of cash to lend without asking too many difficult
questions.
Property in the Auckland CBD was turning over at a
high rate and valuers were in high demand!
If a client were to mention to valuers
that " more work could be forthcoming", then some valuers took their cue
from that remark:
A building to be sold would be valued at say
$10 mill., but the same valuer could value the same property at $9 mill., if the
same client was engaging him for the purpose of buying that
property!
As I said, demand was very high and the money
supply extremely loose; it was important to secure a property, thus,
his client may well have paid $10 mill. to buy it, after all
!!
H: You could say that the Dot-com episode in its
heyday resembled the period before the 1987
crash.
G: True, I read that after the crash of 1987,
the then Plimmer hotel in Wellington sold at 40% of the pre-crash
valuation!
H: Later on, somebody showed me a
valuation of standing timber of some forestry blocks. He calculated
that the share price based on that valuation, should have been about
$25.
But why was it $17 when there was such a high
demand for timber? In reply, I mentioned that the first logs were to
be sold in about three years time.
And what about roading, logging, trucking and
other costs to be incurred? These needed to be deducted and hence the
lower share price!
G: What about valuations of a
Director's property / company to be backed into a
listed or unlisted public company ?
H: There can be several problems: The independent
Directors may not know the true value of the asset to be bought for shares /
options and / or cash.
Sure, they can engage a valuer but the
assets may have " hidden snags " : there are many examples where a
tycoon managed to sell some of his inferior assets at high prices to a
company of which he was also a director!
G: I can see it now: His fellow directors on
the Board are his mates and the " excellent buy " will be approved
even as he does not partake in the voting!
H: Mind you, even without any director being
dishonest, a ' buy ' may proceed simply, because the independent
director(s) lack the skills or never fully studied the pros and cons of a
proposal.
Reading a prospectus from a company to be listed,
can be entertaining at times.
Look at the small print in the last few pages and
you could find some very onerous contracts: One CEO
of a property company had a contract which enabled him to deduct a fee
calculated as a percentage from
gross revenue.
On top of that, he also managed to obtain
a fee on the selling and buying of properties. It was called a '
finders ' fee! Rest assured that there was a good turnover of
properties!
All went well till the interest rates rose sharply
and at the high rate of borrowing that contract became a very onerous one:
Property prices fell, the banks then wanted their money back and the company
collapsed!
G: The calibre and
ability of Directors always are very
important parameters when making investments
!!!
Gerry
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